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Abstract:
The logic of uncertainty is not the logic of experience and as well as it is not the logic of chance. It isthe logic of experience and chance. Experience and chance are two inseparable poles. These are two dualreflections of one essence, which is called co∼event. The theory of experience and chance is the theory ofco∼events. To study the co∼events, it is not enough to study the experience and to study the chance. Forthis, it is necessary to study the experience and chance as a single entire, a co∼event. In other words, itis necessary to study their interaction within a co∼event. The new co∼event axiomatics and the theoryof co∼events following from it were created precisely for these purposes. In this work, I am going todemonstrate the effectiveness of the new theory of co∼events in a studying the logic of uncertainty. I willdo this by the example of a co∼event splitting of the logic of the Bayesian scheme, which has a long historyof fierce debates between Bayesianists and frequentists. I hope the logic of the theory of experience andchance will make its modest contribution to the application of these old dual debaters.
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The statements of science are not of what is true and what is not true,but statements of what is known with different degrees of certainty.
Richard Feynman.
1 “Collider” splitting the classical Bayes’ scheme by the theory of co∼events
The axiomatics of the theory of experience and chance [1] is fundamentally newwith the new semantics1of terms and statements. This axiomatics is not too complicated. However, any attempts to apply the newtheory in various fields, which are a long-lived fiefdom of probability theory and mathematical statistics,face difficulties in translating from a probabilistic language into the dual language of the new theory.This translation reminds me of an investigation of the splitting of previously unsplittable notions ofprobability and event bymeans of a co∼event-based “collider” that is providedwith sufficient power of thenew theory to split what was previously unsplittable and to get instead of one probability two measures:probability and believability, and instead of one event two: a ket-event and a bra-event. Here I intend tosplit the logic of uncertainty by the example of splitting the logic and the interpretation of Bayes’ schemeby this co∼event-based “collider”, i.e., by the co∼event-based axiomatics of the new theory. In orderto present in all details this process of co∼event-based splitting of the previously unsplittable logic ofuncertainty in Bayes’ scheme, I will first present a simpler, crude and naive procedure for the co∼event-based splitting, and then I will go into its refinement. I will carry out this co∼event-based splitting of theBayesian scheme in two stages. In the first stage2, I am going to first compare three formally possiblesplitting methods to choose the most suitable of them. In the second stage (see paragraph 2.1), I’m goingto continue the co∼event-based splitting. However, now I will split the chosen splitting method itself inorder to construct the final formula, which I would call the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem.
c○ 2017 O.Yu.Vorobyev
This is an open-access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permitsunrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium provided the original work is properly cited.
Oleg Vorobyev (ed.), Proc. of the XVI FAMEMS’2017, Krasnoyarsk: SFU, ISBN 978-5-9903358-7-5
1I consider the new co∼event-based semantic is very important for understanding this paper. For this reason, I’m going tohighlight and mark especially the most key places in the text with new semantics for some “become familiar” terms of the classicalprobability theory and statistics.2See details in Tables 1, 2, and 3.
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Certainty theory
Probability theory Believability theory
In pondering an observable chance feature of Nature, andan accumulated own experience, a scientist after all
of the random experiment observes the chance as a limited array ofrandom observations. of the experienced experiment accumulates his/her observer’experience as a limit array of accumulated hypotheses.
Suppose we list them and denote them by the symbols
|𝑋1⟩ ; |𝑋2⟩ ; . . . ; |𝑋𝑁 ⟩ (1.1)
where |𝑋𝑗⟩ for 𝑋𝑗 ∈ SXR is an abbreviation for the ket-event
|ter(𝑋𝑗//XR)⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩;
⟨𝑥1| ; ⟨𝑥2| ; . . . ; ⟨𝑥𝑀 | (1.2)
where ⟨𝑥𝑖| ⊆ ⟨Ω| is a bra-event for 𝑥𝑖 ∈ XR.
Presumably, each of these
random observations has some degree of probability that it willhappen, or else it would not be in the listing. experienced hypotheses has some degree of believability
3 that itwas experienced by the observer, or else it would not have been inthe listing.
Since the list is meant to be exhaustive of
the chances that the scientist expected, a total probability ofall chances of the experienced-random experiment would bedistributed among these𝑁 randomobservations. Norming the totalprobability to a unit of 1, relative probabilities of these randomobservations are expressed by the probabilities
P(|𝑋1⟩);P(|𝑋2⟩); . . . ;P(|𝑋𝑁 ⟩); (1.3)
which sum to 1 whereP(|𝑋𝑗⟩) = Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩), 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 . So theyare expressed by the certainties
Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋1⟩);Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋2⟩); . . . ;Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑁 ⟩); (1.4)
the hypotheses that the scientist experienced, a total believabilityof all hypotheses in the experienced-random experiment would bedistributed among these𝑀 experienced hypotheses. Norming thetotal believability to a unit of 1, relative believabilities of theseexperienced hypotheses are expressed by the believabilities
B(⟨𝑥1|);B(⟨𝑥2|); . . . ;B(⟨𝑥𝑀 |); (1.5)
which sum to 1 where B(⟨𝑥𝑖|) = Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩), 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑀 . So theyare expressed by the certainties
Φ(⟨𝑥1|Ω⟩);Φ(⟨𝑥2|Ω⟩); . . . ;Φ(⟨𝑥𝑀 |Ω⟩); (1.6)
Empirical science is oriented towards collecting new experimental or historical observations that can inform us about
the chances of these random observations (1.1). Suppose we denotethe numerical data that summarises the result of an experiencedrandom experiment, i.e. some co∼event, by a letter R. Co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme provides a logical mathematical framework forcalibrating how the co∼event R should be used to inform us abouta new understanding of the relative certainties given this new data.Technically, it yields numerical values for the conditional certainties
Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋1⟩ |R);Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋2⟩ |R); . . . ;Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑁 ⟩ |R); (1.7)
that are based on their initial information sources augmentedby the new co∼event, R. The numerical differences between thecertainties (1.4) and the conditional certainties (1.7) display whatone can rightfully learn about our assessment of this co∼event.This assessment, in the long and the short of statistical theory, isthe goal of scientific experimentation and data analysis. Becausethese distributions can represent uncertain observable features ofNature before and after co∼event,R, the former is commonly calleda “prior” certainties (1.4), while the latter is called the “posterior”certainties (1.7) for the random observations (1.1).
the experience of these accumulated hypotheses (4.1). Supposewe denote the numerical data that summarises the result of anexperienced random experiment, i.e. some co∼event, by a letter
R. Co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme provides a logical mathematicalframework for calibrating how the co∼event R should be used toinform us about a new understanding of the relative certaintiesgiven this new data. Technically, it yields numerical values for theconditional certainties
Φ(⟨𝑥1|Ω⟩ |R);Φ(⟨𝑥2|Ω⟩ |R); . . . ;Φ(⟨𝑥𝑀 |Ω⟩ |R); (1.8)
that are based on their initial information sources augmentedby the new co∼event, R. The numerical differences between thecertainties (1.6) and the conditional certainties (1.8) display whatone can rightfully learn about our assessment of the accumulatedhypotheses from this co∼event. This assessment, in the long and theshort of statistical theory, is the goal of scientific experimentation anddata analysis. Because these distributions can represent uncertainopinions before and after co∼event, R, the former is commonlycalled a “prior” certainties (1.6), while the latter is called the“posterior” certainties (1.8) for the accumulated hypotheses (4.1).
The Bayes’ scheme in the context of the theory of experience and chancerequires that we assess the certainty of the co∼eventR that occurs, given each of the relevant
random observations. These assessments are represented by thenumbers
Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋1⟩);Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋2⟩); . . . ;Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋𝑁 ⟩) (1.9)
where Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩) = B(⟨𝑋𝑗 |), 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 . The relative sizesof these numbers for the various random observations based onthe same data are commonly referred to as the certainties for therandom observations. Using these certainties for the observed dataon the basis of each of the random observations, co∼event-basedBayes’ scheme allows the computation of each of the “posterior”certainties (1.7) according to the computational formula
Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) =
Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩)Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩)
𝑁∑︁
𝑘=1
Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋𝑘⟩)Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑘⟩)
(1.10)
for each random observation |𝑋𝑗⟩ and “prior” certainties (1.4)whereΦ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) = B(⟨𝑋𝑗 |).
accumulated hypotheses. These assessments are represented by thenumbers
Φ(R| ⟨𝑥1|Ω⟩);Φ(R| ⟨𝑥2|Ω⟩); . . . ;Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑀 |Ω⟩). (1.11)
where Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩) = P(|𝑥𝑖⟩), 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑀 . The relative sizesof these numbers for the various accumulated hypotheses basedon the same data are commonly referred to as the certaintiesfor the accumulated hypotheses. Using these certainties for theobserved data on the basis of each of the accumulated hypotheses,co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme allows the computation of each of the“posterior” certainties (1.8) according to the computational formulacalled the co∼event-based Bayes theorem:
Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩ |R) =
Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩)Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩)
𝑀∑︁
𝑘=1
Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑘|Ω⟩)Φ(⟨𝑥𝑘|Ω⟩)
(1.12)
for each accumulated hypothesis ⟨𝑥𝑖| and “prior” certainties (1.6)whereΦ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩ |R) = P(|𝑥𝑖⟩).
Table 1: A logic of the dual co∼event-based analogies of Bayes’ scheme in the theory of experience and chance.
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Certainty bra-ket theory
Probability ket-theory Believability bra-theory
Rewrite co∼event-based Bayes’ ket- and bra-formulas (1.10, 1.12)by applying the following obvious equalities and useful abbreviations
prior: Φ(R| ⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩) = 𝑏(𝑋𝑗), (1.13)
prior: Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩) = 𝑝(𝑋𝑗), (1.14)
posterior: Φ(⟨Ω|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) = 𝑝post(𝑋𝑗). (1.15)
prior: Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩) = 𝑝𝑥𝑖 , (1.16)prior: Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩) = 𝑏𝑥𝑖 , (1.17)
posterior: Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|Ω⟩ |R) = 𝑏post𝑥𝑖 . (1.18)
Co∼event-based Bayes’ ket-formula that follows from (1.10) Co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem that follows from (1.12)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑝post(𝑋𝑗) = 𝑝(𝑋𝑗) 𝑏(𝑋𝑗)
Φ(R)
,
𝑝post𝑥𝑖 =
∑︁
𝑥𝑖∈𝑋𝑗
𝑝
post
(𝑋𝑗).
(1.19)
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑏post𝑥𝑖 = 𝑏𝑥𝑖
𝑝𝑥𝑖
Φ(R)
,
𝑏post(𝑋𝑗) =
∑︁
𝑥𝑖∈𝑋𝑗
𝑏
post
𝑥𝑖
.
(1.20)
Table 2: A logic of the dual co∼event-based analogies of Bayes’ scheme in the theory of experience and chance in abbreviations.
Certainty bra-ket theory
In pondering a chance of Nature, and an accumulated own experience, a scientist after all
of the experienced-random experiment observes the chance and accumulates his/her observer’ experience as a limited array of “accumulatedhypotheses”× “random observations”.
Suppose we list them and denote them by the symbols
⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩, an abbreviation for the elementary co∼event ⟨𝑥𝑖|ter(𝑋𝑗//XR)⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑀, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 , for 𝑥𝑖 ∈ XR,𝑋𝑗 ∈ SXR ;
Since the list is meant to be exhaustive of
the elementary co∼events that the scientist observed and accumulated, a total certainty of all elementary co∼events of the experienced-randomexperiment would be distributed among these𝑀×𝑁 elementary co∼events ⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩. Norming the total certainty to a unit of 1, relative certaintiesof these elementary co∼events are expressed by the certainties 𝜙𝑥𝑖 (𝑋𝑗) = Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩), 𝑖 = 1, . . . ,𝑀, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑁 .Empirical science is oriented towards collecting new experimental or historical co∼events that can inform us about
these co∼events. Suppose we denote the numerical data that summarises the result of an experienced-random experiment, i.e. some co∼event,by a letter R. Co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme provides a logical mathematical framework for calibrating how the co∼event R should be used toinform us about a new understanding of the relative certainties given this new data. Technically, it yields numerical values for the conditionalcertainties Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) that are based on their initial information sources augmented by the new co∼event, R. The numerical differencesbetween the initial certainties and the conditional certainties display what one can rightfully learn about our assessment of this co∼event. Thisassessment, in the long and the short of statistical theory, is the goal of scientific experienced-random experimentation and data analysis. Becausethese distributions can represent the uncertainty of Nature before and after co∼event, R, the former is commonly called a “prior” certainties,while the latter is called the “posterior” certainties of the elementary co∼events.
The Bayes’ scheme in the context of the theory of experience and chancerequires that we assess the certainty of the co∼eventR that occurs, given each of the relevant
elementary co∼events. These assessments are represented by the numbers Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩). The relative sizes of these numbers for the variouselementary co∼events based on the same data are commonly referred to as the certainties for the elementary co∼events. Using these certaintiesfor the observed data on the basis of each of the co∼events, co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme allows the computation of each of the “posterior”certainties according to the computational formula
Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) =
Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩)Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩)
Φ(R)
(1.21)
for each elementary co∼event ⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩ and their “prior” certainties 𝜙𝑥𝑖 (𝑋𝑗) where
prior certainty: Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩) = 𝜙𝑥𝑖 (𝑋𝑗) = 𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑝(𝑋𝑗), (1.22)
posterior certainty: Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩ |R) = 𝜙post𝑥𝑖 (𝑋𝑗) = [𝑏𝑥𝑖𝑝(𝑋𝑗)]post, (1.23)
Φ(R| ⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩) = 1𝑋𝑗 (𝑥𝑖) =
{︃
1, 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑗 ,
0, otherwise. (1.24)
Hence united co∼event-based Bayes’ bra-ket formula (1.21) can be rewritten in the short form:
𝜙
post
𝑥𝑖
(𝑋𝑗) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
𝜙𝑥𝑖 (𝑋𝑗)
Φ(R)
, 𝑥𝑖 ∈ 𝑋𝑗 ,
0, otherwise.
(1.25)
Table 3: A logic of the united co∼event-based analog of Bayes’ scheme in the theory of experience and chance.
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2 Co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem for a believability measure in the context ofthe theory of experience and chance
Taking up this matter, primarily, I believed that as a result of this dual splitting I will get twodual theorems that are analogous to Bayes’ scheme. The first is about “posterior believability” of anaccumulated hypothesis, and the second is about “posterior probability” of a random observation.Moreover, I assumed I would get one general theorem on the “posterior certainty” of the co∼event.However, this time my “formal” intuition turned out to be powerless. A brutal reality has revealed manymore interesting things than all my ordinary assumptions.
The Tables 1 and 2 compare the logic of the dual analogies of the classical Bayes’ scheme formally inthe contexts of probability theory and believability theory. It remains for me to note that within theframework of the theory of certainties ostensibly another analogy it unites both dual analogies may seempossible (see Table 3).
The logic of uncertainty it follows from the theory of experience and chance allows us to draw acompletely definite conclusion about the three analogies of Bayes’ scheme (1.10, 1.21, 1.20). Of the threelisted analogies, I can consider only the bra-formula (1.20), or what is the same, the bra-formula (1.12),as a more or less suitable contender for the title of the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem. Why?
Firstly, the ket-formula (1.10) “puts the cart before the horse”, “puts the chance before the experience”,“puts the sequence before the cause”, and “puts the past before the future”. It considers that the aposteriori probability of the chance observation as an outcome of a random experiment depends onthe a priori believability of the observer’ experience. This is nonsense.
Secondly, the bra-ket formula (1.21) inherits all the sins of Bayes’ formula interpreted within theframework of probability theory, comparing the probabilities of co∼events from different spaces — ofthe original and conditional spaces.
And thirdly, only the bra-formula (1.20) is free from these contradictions, calculating the a posterioribelievability in the experience of the observer through his/her a priori believability and through the apriori probabilities of his/her chance observations.
At the same time, the third formula (1.20, 1.12) reflects only the most general co∼event-based logic ofuncertainty in the Bayes’ scheme. Although the third formula is true in principle it is too rude and naivefrom the co∼event-based point of view.We now turn to the co∼event-based refinement of these formulas.
2.1 Co∼event-based refinement of the Bayes’ scheme
To refine the formulas (1.20, 1.12) in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme, we need to sacrifice thebrevity of the notation. This is a needful measure. Since three co∼event actors, not one, are involvedin this scheme, and they act in the same bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩.
In pondering a chance of Nature, and an accumulated own experience, a scientist after all of theexperienced-random experiment observes the chance and accumulates his/her observer’ experience astwo co∼events:
R = “Reality (chance, or random observations)” ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ , (2.1)
H = “Hypotheses (accumulated experience)” ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ . (2.2)
From these co∼events we will construct one more useful co∼event
M = (H∆R)𝑐 = “Match Hypotheses with Reality” ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ . (2.3)
Having at our disposal these three co∼event actors, R,H, andM, we can fully describe what is occurringin the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
What does the expression “the co∼event M is at our disposal” in the theory of experience and chancemean?
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This means that we know the probability, believability, and certainty distributions of the co∼eventM:
P(|𝑋⟩) = 𝑝(𝑋//XM), 𝑋 ∈ SXM , (2.4)
B(⟨𝑥|) = 𝑏𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ XM, (2.5)
Φ(⟨𝑥|𝑋⟩) = 𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XM), (𝑥,𝑋) ∈ XM × SXM , (2.6)
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨XM| SXM⟩ generated byM. Similar informationis known to us about events H and R. We know the probability, believability, and certainty distributionsof the co∼eventH:
P(|𝑋⟩) = 𝑝(𝑋//XH), 𝑋 ∈ SXH , (2.7)
B(⟨𝑥|) = 𝑏𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ XH, (2.8)
Φ(⟨𝑥|𝑋⟩) = 𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XH), (𝑥,𝑋) ∈ XH × SXH , (2.9)
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨XH| SXH⟩ generated by H. And we know theprobability, believability, and certainty distributions of the co∼event R:
P(|𝑋⟩) = 𝑝(𝑋//XR), 𝑋 ∈ SXR , (2.10)
B(⟨𝑥|) = 𝑏𝑥, 𝑥 ∈ XR, (2.11)
Φ(⟨𝑥|𝑋⟩) = 𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XR), (𝑥,𝑋) ∈ XR × SXR , (2.12)
defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩, which has the labelling ⟨XR| SXR⟩ generated by R.
Nowwe see that to refine themathematical description of the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme, wemustdescribe three co∼events, which are defined on the same bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩. Here the most importantdifficulty is they generate three different labellings ⟨XH| SXH⟩, ⟨XR| SXR⟩, and ⟨XM| SXM⟩ of this space.
The labelling ⟨XH| SXH⟩ is generated by the co∼event H that describes results of the preliminaryexperienced-random experiment in which “an observer for each observation puts forward one oranother subset of hypotheses about the observation”. For example, “the observer preliminary checkupsof the set of patients and for each patient puts forward the one or another subset of hypotheses abouther/his diagnosis”.
The labelling ⟨XR| SXR⟩ is generated by the co∼event R that describes results of the experienced-randomexperiment in which “an observer for each observation takes a real decision based on completeinformation about the observation”. For example, “the observer for each patient determines a realdiagnosis based on a complete medical examination of the patient”.
The labelling ⟨XM| SXM⟩ is generated by the co∼eventM = (H∆M)𝑐 that is a co∼event-valued function of
H and R. In other words, the co∼eventM is defined by two experienced-random experiments as a resultof which two co∼events occur:H (“Hypotheses”) and R (“Reality”). The labelling ⟨XM| SXM⟩ is defined as aMinkowski intersection of two previous labellings
⟨XM| SXM⟩ = ⟨XH| SXH⟩ (∩) ⟨XR| SXR⟩ (2.13)
where
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| (∩) ⟨XR| =
{︁
⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| : 𝑥× ∈ XH, 𝑥∘ ∈ XR, ⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| ≠ ∅⟨Ω|
}︁
, (2.14)
| SXM⟩ = | SXH⟩ (∩) | SXH⟩ = {︁ |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ : 𝑋× ∈ SXH , 𝑋∘ ∈ SXR , |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ ≠ ∅|Ω⟩}︁. (2.15)
In our case of co∼event-based Bayesian scheme we have equality for all 𝑥 ∈ XM
⟨𝑥| = ⟨𝑥×| = ⟨𝑥∘| (2.16)
from which it follows that
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| = ⟨XR| . (2.17)
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3 Co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem
The observer twice conducts a series of 𝑁 observations of the same set of corresponding 𝑁 objects.First, the observer conducts preliminary observations {|𝑋×1 ⟩ , . . . , |𝑋×𝑁 ⟩} of all objects to put forward thecorresponding subsets of hypotheses from the set of 𝑀 hypotheses {⟨𝑥1|𝑥×1 ⟩ , . . . , ⟨𝑥𝑀 |𝑥×𝑀 ⟩} about theresults of exhaustive observations and examinations {|𝑋∘1⟩ , . . . , |𝑋∘𝑁 ⟩} of the𝑁 objects, as a result of whichthe co∼event
H = “Hypotheses” = ⟨𝑥1|𝑥×1 ⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥𝑀 |𝑥×𝑀 ⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ (3.1)
occurs. Then the observer conducts exhaustive observations and examinations {|𝑋∘1⟩ , . . . , |𝑋∘𝑁 ⟩} of the 𝑁objects, as a result of which the co∼event
R = “Reality” = ⟨𝑥1|𝑥∘1⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥𝑀 |𝑥∘𝑀 ⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ (3.2)
occurs and defines the corresponding subsets of the set of 𝑀 real conclusions {⟨𝑥1|𝑥∘1⟩ , . . . , ⟨𝑥𝑀 |𝑥∘𝑀 ⟩}.After comparing the eventsH and R the co∼event
M = (H∆R)𝑐 = “Match Hypotheses with Reality” = ⟨𝑥1|(𝑥×1∆𝑥∘1)𝑐⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥𝑀 |(𝑥×1∆𝑥∘𝑀 )𝑐⟩ (3.3)
occurs, which I am going to use as the basis in a formulation of the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem4.
Theorem 1 (co∼event-based Bayes theorem). Let H = “Hypotheses”, R = “Reality”, and M = (H∆R)𝑐 =“Match Hypotheses with Reality” be co∼events defined on the bra-ket space ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ from the certaintyspace (⟨Ω|Ω⟩ , ⟨A|A⟩ ,Φ) = ⟨Ω,A,B|Ω,A,P⟩ with believability B, probability P, and certainty Φ = B × P.Let ⟨XH| SXH⟩, ⟨XR| SXR⟩, and ⟨XM| SXM⟩ be labellings generated by the co∼events H,R, and M ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩respectively where
⟨XM| SXM⟩ = ⟨XH| SXH⟩ (∩) ⟨XR| SXR⟩ , (3.4)
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| (∩) ⟨XR| =
{︁
⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| : 𝑥× ∈ XH, 𝑥∘ ∈ XR, ⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| ≠ ∅⟨Ω|
}︁
, (3.5)
| SXM⟩ = | SXH⟩ (∩) | SXH⟩ = {︁ |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ : 𝑋× ∈ SXH , 𝑋∘ ∈ SXR , |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ ≠ ∅|Ω⟩}︁, (3.6)
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| = ⟨XR| . (3.7)
Let also 𝑏𝑥× = B(⟨𝑥×|) and 𝑏post𝑥× = Bpost(⟨𝑥×|) be respectively a priori and a posteriori believability of thehypothesis ⟨𝑥| , 𝑥 ∈ XM, and 𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘) = P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐) be a probability of match the ket-event |𝑥×⟩with theket-event |𝑥∘⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩. At last, let a posteriori believability of bra-event ⟨𝑥×| ⊆ ⟨Ω| under the condition thatMhas occurred is equal to the fraction of certainty of the sub-co∼event ⟨𝑥×|(𝑥×∆𝑥∘)𝑐⟩ ⊆ M in the certainty ofthe co∼eventM:
𝑏post𝑥× =
Φ(⟨𝑥×|(𝑥×∆𝑥∘)𝑐⟩)
Φ(M)
. (3.8)
Then a posteriori and a priori believability distributions {𝑏𝑥× : 𝑥 ∈ XM} and {𝑏post𝑥× : 𝑥 ∈ XM} are related bythe co∼event-based Bayesian formula for 𝑥 ∈ XM:
𝑏post𝑥× = 𝑏𝑥×
𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘)∑︁
𝑥∈XM
𝑏𝑥×𝜇(𝑥
×, 𝑥∘)
. (3.9)
Proof.We use as the template the third co∼event formula (1.20, 1.12) of the Bayesian scheme chosen byus from Tables 1, 2, and 3 in order to rewrite it for the eventM in the following way:
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩ |M) = Φ(M | ⟨𝑥
×|Ω⟩)Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩)
Φ(M)
. (3.10)
4The figure 12 shows Venn diagrams of three co∼events from the co∼event-based Bayes’ scheme: H,R, andM for𝑀 = 𝑁 = 10,obtained as the results of two experienced-random experiments: of hypothetic where the co∼eventH occurs and of real where theco∼event R occurs.
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Now it remains for us to notice the following equalities:
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩) = B(⟨𝑥×|) = 𝑏𝑥× , (3.11)
Φ(M | ⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩) = P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐) = 𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘), (3.12)
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩ |M) = Bpost(⟨𝑥×|) = 𝑏post𝑥× (3.13)
in order for the theorem to be proved. Indeed, we have the equality (3.11) because
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩) = B(⟨𝑥×|)P(|Ω⟩)
= B(⟨𝑥×|) = 𝑏𝑥× ,
the equality (3.12) because
Φ(M | ⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩) = Φ(M ∩ ⟨𝑥
×|Ω⟩)
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩) =
Φ(⟨𝑥×|(𝑥×∆𝑥∘)𝑐⟩)
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩)
=
B(⟨𝑥×|)P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐)
B(⟨𝑥×|) (3.14)
= P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐) = 𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘) (3.15)
due to the fact that for ket-events |(𝑥×∆𝑥∘)𝑐⟩ = (|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐. At last, the equality (3.13) follows from ourmain co∼event-based Bayes assumption (3.8) because
Φ(⟨𝑥×|Ω⟩ |M) = Φ(⟨𝑥
×|Ω⟩ ∩M)
Φ(M)
=
Φ(⟨𝑥×|(𝑥×∆𝑥∘)𝑐⟩)
Φ(M)
= Bpost(⟨𝑥×|) = 𝑏post𝑥× . (3.16)
Finally, from (3.11), (3.12), and (3.13) it follows that
Bpost(⟨𝑥×|) = B(⟨𝑥×|) P((|𝑥
×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐)∑︁
𝑥∈XR
B(⟨𝑥×|)P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐)
= 𝑏𝑥×
𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘)∑︁
𝑥∈XM
𝑏𝑥×𝜇(𝑥
×, 𝑥∘)
(3.17)
where
𝜇(𝑥×, 𝑥∘) = P((|𝑥×⟩∆ |𝑥∘⟩)𝑐) = 1− 𝑝𝑥× − 𝑝𝑥∘ + 2𝑝𝑥×𝑥∘ ,
𝑝𝑥× = P(|𝑥×⟩),
𝑝𝑥∘ = P(|𝑥∘⟩),
𝑝𝑥×𝑥∘ = P(|𝑥×⟩ ∩ |𝑥∘⟩).
The theorem is proved.
Corollary 1 (on a posteriori certainty of co∼event M). The posterior believability distribution
{𝑏post𝑥 : 𝑥 ∈ XM} calculated by the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem (1) defines the posterior certainty of theco∼eventM = “Match Hypotheses with Reality” by the following formula:
Φpost(M) =
∑︁
𝑥∈XM
∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋∈ SXR
𝑏post𝑥 𝑝(𝑋//XR). (3.18)
Proof. The corollary is valid because 𝜙post𝑥 (𝑋) = 𝑏post𝑥 𝑝(𝑋//XM) for 𝑥 ∈ XM and 𝑋 ∈ SXM and because thecertainty measure Φ is additive.
4 An example: “Doctor and Patients with a headache”
Suppose you are a doctor, and a patient comes to you, complaining of a headache. Further, suppose thatthere are two yours hypotheses for why people get headaches, they can have a headache due to a braintumor: ⟨𝑥| ⊆ ⟨Ω|, or they can have a headache due to a cold: ⟨𝑦| ⊆ ⟨Ω|, ⟨𝑥| + ⟨𝑦| = ⟨Ω|. The diagnosisof people can be of four varieties, they might have a brain tumor: |{𝑥}⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, they might have a cold:
|{𝑦}⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, they might have a brain tumor and a cold: |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩, and, finally, they may have neither
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a brain tumor nor a cold: |∅⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ where |{𝑥}⟩ + |{𝑦}⟩ + |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ + |∅⟩ = |Ω⟩. A brain tumor always causesa headache, but exceedingly few people have a brain tumor. In contrast, a headache is rarely a symptomof cold, but most people manage to catch a cold every single year.
Let us assume that after your preliminary checkup of the 200 patients your hypotheses formed thestatistics of the co∼event H =“headaches”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥×}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥×, 𝑦×}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦×}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|∅×⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩. Thestatistics of hypothetic diagnoses allows you to evaluate the probabilities of hypothetic diagnoses of the200 patients as follows:
𝑝({𝑥×}) = P(|{𝑥×}⟩), 𝑝({𝑦×}) = P(|{𝑦×}⟩), 𝑝({𝑥×, 𝑦×}) = P(|{𝑥×, 𝑦×}⟩), 𝑝(∅×) = 𝑃 (|∅×⟩). (4.1)
Then after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients, the real statistics of the co∼event
R = “headaches”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥∘}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|∅∘⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ turns out at your disposal. The realstatistics allows you to evaluate the probabilities of real diagnoses of the 200 patients as follows:
𝑝({𝑥∘}) = P(|{𝑥∘}⟩), 𝑝({𝑦∘}) = P(|{𝑦∘}⟩), 𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) = P(|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩), 𝑝(∅∘) = P(|∅∘⟩). (4.2)
Provided that the co∼event M = (H∆R)𝑐 = “match hypotheses with real diagnoses” occurred and inthe absence of other information on believabilities of yours hypotheses, i.e. B(⟨𝑥|) = 𝑏𝑥 = 1/2,B(⟨𝑦|) =
𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, do you think it is more believably that a headache is caused by a tumor: ⟨𝑥|, or by a cold: ⟨𝑦|? Inother words, do you think how the believability distribution of your hypotheses could be after a completemedical examination of the 200 patients? The answer to this question you can get with the help of theco∼event-based Bayes’ theorem (3.9).
In the terminology of the example “Doctor and Patients” the labelling ⟨XH| SXH⟩ is generated by theco∼event H that describes results of the experienced-random experiment “preliminary checkup of the200 patients and assigning their diagnosis to the first or the second hypothesis”. The labelling ⟨XR| SXR⟩is generated by the co∼event R that describes results of the experienced-random experiment “assigningdiagnosis to the first or the second type after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients”.The labelling ⟨XM| SXM⟩ is generated by the co∼eventM = (H∆R)𝑐 that is a co∼event-valued function of
H and R. In other words, the co∼event R is defined by two experienced-random experiments “checkupof the 200 patients and assigning their diagnosis to the first or the second hypothesis” (H) and “assigningdiagnosis to the first or the second type after a complete medical examination of the same 200 patients”(R). And the labelling ⟨XM| SXM⟩ is defined as a Minkowski intersection of two previous labellings
⟨XM| SXM⟩ = ⟨XH| SXH⟩ (∩) ⟨XR| SXR⟩ (4.3)
where
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| (∩) ⟨XR| =
{︁
⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| : ⟨𝑥×| ∈ ⟨X×| , ⟨𝑥∘| ∈ ⟨X∘| , ⟨𝑥×| ∩ ⟨𝑥∘| ≠ ∅⟨Ω|
}︁ (4.4)
| SXM⟩ = | SXH⟩ (∩) | SXR⟩ = {︁ |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ : |𝑋×⟩ ∈ | SXH⟩ , |𝑋∘⟩ ∈ | SXR⟩ , |𝑋×⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘⟩ ≠ ∅|Ω⟩}︁. (4.5)
In our case of co∼event-based Bayesian scheme we have equality ⟨𝑥| = ⟨𝑥×| = ⟨𝑥∘| for all 𝑥 ∈ XR fromwhich it follows that
⟨XM| = ⟨XH| = ⟨XR| . (4.6)
We’ll continue with a few brief examples, illustrating the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem (see Theorem1). Let’s consider examples in which the hypothesis statistics of the co∼event H will be the same (seeTable 4), and the real statistics of the co∼event R will be presented in three variants (see Table 5, at thetop). Correspondingly, the statistics of the co∼event M = (H∆R)𝑐 will be presented also in the threevariants (see Table 5 at the bottom).
In the first example (Tables 4, 5) with a posteriori certainty one5 the posteriori believability distribution
5Within the theory of co∼events, the semantics of texts about the measurement of uncertainty acquires a new and precisemeaning. This is the novelty of the semantics of terms, which is fundamentally different from the semantics of terms inKolmogorov’s theory of probability and is intended to interpret the relationship between the three measures of this theory:believability, probability and certainty.
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of your hypotheses is uniform:
𝑏post𝑥 = 𝑏𝑥
𝑝𝑥
Φ(M)
= 1/2, (4.7)
𝑏post𝑦 = 𝑏𝑦
𝑝𝑦
Φ(M)
= 1/2, (4.8)
Φ(M) =
∑︁
𝑧∈{𝑥,𝑦}
∑︁
𝑍∈{{𝑥},{𝑥,𝑦},{𝑦},∅}
𝜙𝑧(𝑍) = 1, (4.9)
Φpost(M) =
∑︁
𝑧∈{𝑥,𝑦}
∑︁
𝑍∈{{𝑥},{𝑥,𝑦},{𝑦},∅}
𝜙post𝑧 (𝑍) = 1. (4.10)
In the second example (Tables 4, 7) by virtue of the fact thatΦ(M) = 0, the co∼event-based Bayes’ theoremis not applicable and the posterior believability distribution and the posterior certainty of M remain tobe undefined.
b.tumor: |{𝑥×}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥×, 𝑦×}⟩ cold: |{𝑦×}⟩ nothing: |∅×⟩
𝑝({𝑥×}) 𝑝({𝑥×, 𝑦×}) 𝑝({𝑦×}) 𝑝(∅×)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑥×}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑥×, 𝑦×})
1/2 4/200 1/200 0 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥×, 𝑦×}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑦×})
1/2 0 1/200 75/200 0
Table 4: A priori. Venn diagram of the co∼eventH = “Hypotheses”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥×}⟩+ ⟨Ω|{𝑥×, 𝑦×}⟩+ ⟨𝑦|{𝑦×}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩with the labelling ⟨XH| SXH ⟩ =
⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥×}, {𝑥×, 𝑦×}, {𝑦×}, ∅×}⟩, with probabilities of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥× = 10/200, 𝑝𝑦× = 0.152/200, a priori believabilities of bra-events: 𝑏𝑥 =
1/2, 𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, and with certaintyΦ(H) = 81/200.
b.tumor: |{𝑥∘}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ cold: |{𝑦∘}⟩ nothing: |∅∘⟩
𝑝({𝑥∘}) 𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑦∘}) 𝑝(∅∘)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑥∘}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘})
1/2 4/200 1/200 0 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑦∘})
1/2 0 1/200 75/200 0
b.tumor: |{𝑥}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ cold: |{𝑦}⟩ nothing: |∅⟩
𝑝({𝑥}) 𝑝({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝑝({𝑦}) 𝑝(∅)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑥}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑦}) 𝜙𝑥(∅)
1/2 4/200 1/200 75/200 20/200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑦}) 𝜙𝑦(∅)
1/2 4/200 1/200 75/200 20/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏post𝑥 𝜙post𝑥 ({𝑥}) 𝜙post𝑥 ({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑥 ({𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑥 (∅)
1/2 4/200 1/200 75/200 20/200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏post𝑦 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑥}) 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑦 (∅)
1/2 4/200 1/200 75/200 20/200
Table 5: Example 1, at the top: A priori. Venn diagram of the co∼event R = “Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥∘}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦∘}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with thelabelling ⟨XR| SXR ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥∘}, {𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}, {𝑦∘}, ∅}⟩, with real statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥∘ = 10/200, 𝑝𝑦∘ = 152/200, a priori believabilities ofbra-events: 𝑏𝑥 = 1/2, 𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, and with certaintyΦ(R) = 81/200. At the bottom: A posteriori. Venn diagram of the co∼eventM = (HΔR)𝑐 =“Match Hypotheses with Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥}⟩+ ⟨Ω|{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩+ ⟨𝑦|{𝑦}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩with the labelling ⟨XM| SXM ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑦}, ∅}⟩, with realstatistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥 = 1, 𝑝𝑦 = 1, a posteriori believabilities of bra-events: 𝑏post𝑥 = 1/2, 𝑏post𝑦 = 1/2, and a posteriori certaintyΦpost(M) = 1.
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Example 1: XR = {𝑥1, 𝑥2},
|𝑋1⟩ = |𝑋×1 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋2⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
2 ⟩ ,
|𝑋3⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋4⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
4 ⟩ .
{︀
𝑏post𝑥1 , 𝑏
post
𝑥2
}︀
= {1/2, 1/2}
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  |Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋×1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋1⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋2⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋3⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋4⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩ ⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × ×× × × × × × ×
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
R
H M
Table 6: Venn diagrams of the three co∼eventsH,R, andM = (HΔR)𝑐 (︁ × , ○ , ⊗ )︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
b.tumor: |{𝑥∘}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ cold: |{𝑦∘}⟩ nothing: |∅∘⟩
𝑝({𝑥∘}) 𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑦∘}) 𝑝(∅∘)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑦∘}) 𝜙𝑥(∅∘)
1/2 0 0 75/200 20/200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥∘}) 𝜙𝑦(∅∘)
1/2 4/200 0 0 20/200
b.tumor: |{𝑥}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ cold: |{𝑦}⟩ nothing: |∅⟩
𝑝({𝑥}) 𝑝({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝑝({𝑦}) 𝑝(∅)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥1/2 0 0 0 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦1/2 0 0 0 0
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏post𝑥
undefined 0 0 0 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏post𝑦
undefined 0 0 0 0
Table 7: Example 2, at the top: A priori. Venn diagram of the co∼event R = “Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥∘}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦∘}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with thelabelling ⟨XR| SXR ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥∘}, {𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}, {𝑦∘}, ∅}⟩, with real statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥∘ = 190/200, 𝑝𝑦∘ = 48/200, a priori believabilities ofbra-events: 𝑏𝑥 = 1/2, 𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, and with certaintyΦ(R) = 119/200. At the bottom: A posteriori. Venn diagram of the co∼eventM = (HΔR)𝑐 =“Match Hypotheses with Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥}⟩+ ⟨Ω|{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩+ ⟨𝑦|{𝑦}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩with the labelling ⟨XM| SXM ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑦}, ∅}⟩, with realstatistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥 = 0, 𝑝𝑦 = 0, a priori certainty Φ(M) = 0, undefined a posteriori believabilities of bra-events: 𝑏post𝑥 , 𝑏post𝑦 , and undefined aposteriori certaintyΦpost(M).
Example 2: XR = {𝑥1, 𝑥2},
|𝑋1⟩ = |𝑋×1 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋2⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
2 ⟩ ,
|𝑋3⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋4⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
4 ⟩ .
{︀
𝑏post𝑥1 , 𝑏
post
𝑥2
}︀
= “undefined”
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  |Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋×1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋1⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋2⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋3⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋4⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩ ⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × ×× × × × × × ×
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ × × × × × × × ○
R
H M
Table 8: Venn diagrams of the three co∼eventsH,R, andM = (HΔR)𝑐 (︁ × , ○ , ⊗ )︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
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b.tumor: |{𝑥∘}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ cold: |{𝑦∘}⟩ nothing: |∅∘⟩
𝑝({𝑥∘}) 𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑦∘}) 𝑝(∅∘)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑦∘})
1/2 0 0 75/200 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑦∘})
1/2 0 1/200 75/200 0
b.tumor: |{𝑥}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ cold: |{𝑦}⟩ nothing: |∅⟩
𝑝({𝑥}) 𝑝({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝑝({𝑦}) 𝑝(∅)
8/200 2/200 150/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥(∅)
1/2 0 0 0 20/200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑦}) 𝜙𝑦(∅)
1/2 4/200 1/200 75/200 20/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏post𝑥 𝜙post𝑥 (∅)
1/6 0 0 0 40/1200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏post𝑦 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑥}) 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑥, 𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑦 (∅)
5/6 40/1200 10/1200 750/1200 200/1200
Table 9: Example 3, at the top: A priori. Venn diagram of the co∼event R = “Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥∘}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦∘}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with thelabelling ⟨XR| SXR ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥∘}, {𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}, {𝑦∘}, ∅}⟩, with real statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥∘ = 150/200, 𝑝𝑦∘ = 152/200, a priori believabilities ofbra-events: 𝑏𝑥 = 1/2, 𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, and with certaintyΦ(R) = 151/200. At the bottom: A posteriori. Venn diagram of the co∼eventM = (HΔR)𝑐 =“Match Hypotheses with Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with the labelling ⟨XM| SXM ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑦}, ∅}⟩, withreal statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥 = 40/200, 𝑝𝑦 = 1, a posteriori believabilities of bra-events: 𝑏post𝑥 = 1/6, 𝑏post𝑦 = 5/6, and with a priori certainty
Φ(M) = 120/200 = 0.6, and a posteriori certaintyΦpost(M) = 1040/1200 = 13/15 ≈ 0.867.
b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ b.tumor: |{𝑥∘}⟩ b.tumor & cold: |{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ cold: |{𝑦∘}⟩ nothing: |∅∘⟩
𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝑝({𝑦∘}) 𝑝(∅∘)
8/200 2/200 120/200 30/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑦∘})1/2 4/200 0 60/200 15/200 0
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙𝑦({𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}) 𝜙′𝑦({𝑦∘}) 𝜙′′𝑦({𝑦∘})1/2 4/200 1/200 0 15/200 0
|𝑋1⟩ = |{𝑥}⟩ |𝑋2⟩′ = |{𝑦}⟩′ |𝑋3⟩ = |∅⟩ |𝑋2⟩′′ = |{𝑦}⟩′′ |𝑋4⟩ = |{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩
𝑝({𝑥}) 𝑝′({𝑦}) 𝑝(∅) 𝑝′′({𝑦}) 𝑝({𝑥, 𝑦})
8/200 2/200 120/200 30/200 40/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏𝑥 𝜙𝑥({𝑥}) 𝜙𝑥({𝑥, 𝑦})1/2 4/200 0 0 0 20/200
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏𝑦 𝜙′𝑦({𝑦}) 𝜙′′𝑦({𝑦}) 𝜙𝑦({𝑥, 𝑦})1/2 0 1/200 0 15/200 20/200
b.tumor: ⟨𝑥| 𝑏post𝑥 𝜙post𝑥 ({𝑥}) 𝜙post𝑥 ({𝑥, 𝑦})2/5 16/1000 0 0 0 80/1000
cold: ⟨𝑦| 𝑏post𝑦 𝜙′post𝑦 ({𝑦}) 𝜙′′post𝑦 ({𝑦}) 𝜙post𝑦 ({𝑥, 𝑦})3/5 0 6/1000 0 90/1000 120/1000
Table 10: Example 4, at the top: A priori. Venn diagram of the co∼event R = “Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥∘}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦∘}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with thelabelling ⟨XR| SXR ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥∘}, {𝑥∘, 𝑦∘}, {𝑦∘}, ∅}⟩, with real statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥∘ = 158/200, 𝑝𝑦∘ = 40/200, a priori believabilities ofbra-events: 𝑏𝑥 = 1/2, 𝑏𝑦 = 1/2, and with certaintyΦ(R) = 99/200. At the bottom: A posteriori. Venn diagram of the co∼eventM = (HΔR)𝑐 =“Match Hypotheses with Reality”= ⟨𝑥|{𝑥}⟩ + ⟨Ω|{𝑥, 𝑦}⟩ + ⟨𝑦|{𝑦}⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ with the labelling ⟨XM| SXM ⟩ = ⟨{𝑥, 𝑦}|{{𝑥}, {𝑥, 𝑦}, {𝑦}, ∅}⟩, withreal statistics of ket-events: 𝑝𝑥 = 48/200, 𝑝𝑦 = 72/200, a posteriori believabilities of bra-events: 𝑏post𝑥 = 2/5, 𝑏post𝑦 = 3/5, and with a priori certainty
Φ(M) = 0.300, and a posteriori certaintyΦpost(M) = 0.312.
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Example 3: XR = {𝑥1, 𝑥2},
|𝑋1⟩ = |𝑋×1 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋2⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
2 ⟩ ,
|𝑋3⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋4⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
4 ⟩ .
{︀
𝑏post𝑥1 , 𝑏
post
𝑥2
}︀
= {1/6, 5/6}
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  |Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋×1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋1⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋2⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋3⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋4⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩ ⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × ×× × × × × × ×
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
R
H M
Example 4: XR = {𝑥1, 𝑥2},
|𝑋1⟩ = |𝑋×1 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋2⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋3⟩ = |𝑋×3 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋4⟩ = |𝑋×3 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋5⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋
∘
4 ⟩ .
{︀
𝑏post𝑥1 , 𝑏
post
𝑥2
}︀
= {2/5, 3/5}
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  |Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋×1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×4 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋1⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋2⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋3⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋4⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋5⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎨⎩ ⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁× × × ×× × × × × × ×
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁⊗ ⊗ × × ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ⊗ ⊗ × × × ⊗ ⊗
R
H M
Table 11: Venn diagrams of the three co∼eventsH,R, andM = (HΔR)𝑐 (︁ × , ○ , ⊗ )︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
In the third example (Tables 4, 9) the prior certainty is 0.6 and with a posteriori certainty 0.867 theposteriori believability distribution of your hypotheses has the form:
𝑏post𝑥 = 𝑏𝑥
𝑝𝑥
Φ(M)
= 1/6, (4.11)
𝑏post𝑦 = 𝑏𝑦
𝑝𝑦
Φ(M)
= 5/6, (4.12)
Φpost(M) =
∑︁
𝑧∈{𝑥,𝑦}
∑︁
𝑍∈{{𝑥},{𝑥,𝑦},{𝑦},∅}
𝜙post𝑧 (𝑍) = 0.867. (4.13)
In the fourth example (Tables 4, 10) the prior certainty is 0.6 and with a posteriori certainty 0.867 theposteriori believability distribution of your hypotheses has the form:
𝑏post𝑥 = 𝑏𝑥
𝑝𝑥
Φ(M)
= 2/5, (4.14)
𝑏post𝑦 = 𝑏𝑦
𝑝𝑦
Φ(M)
= 3/5, (4.15)
Φpost(M) =
∑︁
𝑧∈{𝑥,𝑦}
∑︁
𝑍∈{{𝑥},{𝑥,𝑦},{𝑦},∅}
𝜙post𝑧 (𝑍) = 0.312. (4.16)
5 Once more example: “10 tasters trying wine from 10 bottles”
Imagine 10 tasters {𝑥1, . . . , 𝑥10} trying wine from 10 bottles whose winemakers are known. First, eachtaster, after recognizing the wine maker of the wine, puts forward hypothesis whether this wine is goodor not. As a result of such an experience-random experiment the co∼event
H = “Hypotheses” = ⟨𝑥1|𝑥×1 ⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥10|𝑥×10⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ (5.1)
occurs. Here |𝑥×𝑗 ⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ is the 𝑗-th subset of 10 bottles such that the 𝑗-th taster assumes the wine from thissubset of bottles would be good. Second, each taster tasting wine from each bottle. As a result of such an
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experience-random experiment the co∼event
R = “Reality” = ⟨𝑥1|𝑥∘1⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥10|𝑥∘10⟩ ⊆ ⟨Ω|Ω⟩ (5.2)
occurs. Here |𝑥∘𝑗⟩ ⊆ |Ω⟩ is the 𝑗-th subset of 10 bottles such that the 𝑗-th taster considers the wine fromthis subset of bottles is good. After comparing the co∼eventsH and R the co∼event
M = (H∆R)𝑐 = “Match Hypotheses with Reality” = ⟨𝑥1|(𝑥×1∆𝑥∘1)𝑐⟩+ . . . + ⟨𝑥𝑀 |(𝑥×1∆𝑥∘𝑀 )𝑐⟩ (5.3)
occurs.
Example 5:
XR = {𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5, 𝑥6, 𝑥7, 𝑥8, 𝑥9, 𝑥10},
|𝑋1⟩ = |𝑋×1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋2⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘1 ⟩ ,
|𝑋3⟩ = |𝑋×2 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘2 ⟩ ,
|𝑋4⟩ = |𝑋×3 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘2 ⟩ ,
|𝑋5⟩ = |𝑋×3 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋6⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘3 ⟩ ,
|𝑋7⟩ = |𝑋×4 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘4 ⟩ ,
|𝑋8⟩ = |𝑋×5 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘4 ⟩ ,
|𝑋9⟩ = |𝑋×5 ⟩ ∩ |𝑋∘5 ⟩ ,
|𝑋10⟩ = |𝑋×6 ⟩ .
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋∘1 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘4 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋∘5 ⟩⏞  ⏟  
⟨Ω|
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁
⟨𝑥3|
{︁
⟨𝑥4|
{︁
⟨𝑥5|
{︁
⟨𝑥6|
{︁
⟨𝑥7|
{︁
⟨𝑥8|
{︁
⟨𝑥9|
{︁
⟨𝑥10|
{︁
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
|Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  |Ω⟩⏞  ⏟  
|𝑋×1 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋×2 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×3 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×4 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×5 ⟩⏞  ⏟  |𝑋×6 ⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋1⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋2⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋3⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋4⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋5⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋6⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋7⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋8⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋9⟩⏞ ⏟ |𝑋10⟩⏞ ⏟ 
⟨Ω|
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁
⟨𝑥3|
{︁
⟨𝑥4|
{︁
⟨𝑥5|
{︁
⟨𝑥6|
{︁
⟨𝑥7|
{︁
⟨𝑥8|
{︁
⟨𝑥9|
{︁
⟨𝑥10|
{︁
× × × × × ×
× × × × ×
× × × × × ×
× × × × × ×
× × × ×
× × × × ×
× × × × × ×
× × × × ×
× × × × ×
× × × × × ×
⟨𝑥1|
{︁
⟨𝑥2|
{︁
⟨𝑥3|
{︁
⟨𝑥4|
{︁
⟨𝑥5|
{︁
⟨𝑥6|
{︁
⟨𝑥7|
{︁
⟨𝑥8|
{︁
⟨𝑥9|
{︁
⟨𝑥10|
{︁
○ ⊗ ⊗ ○ × ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ○
× × ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ○ ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ × × ×
× × × ○ ○ ○ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗
○ ○ × ⊗ ⊗ × ○ ○
○ ○ ○ ⊗ × × × ×
× × × ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ○
⊗ ○ × × ○ ⊗ ⊗ ○
○ ⊗ × ○ ⊗ ⊗ ○ ×
○ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ⊗ ○ × ⊗ ○
R
H M
Table 12: Venn diagrams of the three co∼eventsH,R, andM = (HΔR)𝑐 (︁ × , ○ , ⊗ )︁ in the co∼event-based Bayesian scheme.
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Table 12 shows the results of the tasting. The believability and probability characteristics of the co∼event
M have the following forms
?˘?XM = {𝑏𝑥 : 𝑥 ∈ XM} = {𝑏1, . . . , 𝑏10} = {0.02, 0.04, 0.06, 0.09, 0.11, 0.13, 0.15, 0.17, 0.19, 0.04},
𝑝XM = {𝑝𝑥 : 𝑥 ∈ XM} = {𝑝1, . . . , 𝑝10} = {0.60, 0.50, 0.40, 0.40, 0.40, 0.30, 0.60, 0.50, 0.50, 0.60},
pXM = {𝑝(𝑋/XM) :𝑋 ∈ SXM} = {𝑝(1), . . . , 𝑝(10)} = {0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10, 0.10}
where [1, 2] for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 10, and 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 10
𝑏𝑖 = 𝑏𝑥𝑖 = B(⟨𝑥𝑖|),
𝑝𝑖 = 𝑝𝑥𝑖 = P(|𝑥𝑖⟩),
𝑝(𝑗) = 𝑝(𝑋𝑗//XM)=P(|ter(𝑋𝑗)⟩).
The fact that the wine from 10 bottles has good quality in the opinion of 10 tasters has the prior certainty
Φ(M) =
∑︁
⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩∈M
Φ(⟨𝑥𝑖|𝑋𝑗⟩) =
10∑︁
𝑗=0
10∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑏𝑖𝑝(𝑗)1𝑋𝑗(𝑥𝑖) = 0.470, (5.4)
With the posterior certainty 0.489 the posterior believability distribution of the co∼eventM calculated bythe co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem have the following values6:
?˘?postXM = {0.027, 0.045, 0.054, 0.072, 0.090, 0.081, 0.190, 0.181, 0.204, 0.054}, (5.5)
Φpost(M) =
10∑︁
𝑗=0
10∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑏post𝑖 𝑝(𝑗)1𝑋𝑗(𝑥𝑖) = 0.489. (5.6)
6 A recurrent sequence of co∼event-based Bayes’ formulas
After computing the a posteriori characteristics of the co∼event M (see, for example, (5.5) and (5.6)), itbecomes possible to use the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem once again, applying it not to the a priori,but to the a posteriori characteristics obtained in the first step. This recurrent procedure can be appliedrepeatedly to trace changes in the posterior characteristics of the eventM.
Theorem 2 (the limit believability distribution in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes’ formula). Let thesubset 𝑋max = {𝑥 : 𝑥 ∈ XM, 𝑝𝑥 = max𝑦∈XM 𝑝𝑦} ⊆ XM consists of all such 𝑥 ∈ XM for which the probabilities
𝑝𝑥 take a maximum value. Then the limit believability distribution in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes’formula
𝑏
(𝑛+1)
𝑖 = 𝑏
(𝑛)
𝑖
𝑝𝑖
Φ(𝑛)(M)
, 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, (6.1)
Φ(𝑛+1)(M) =
𝑀∑︁
𝑗=0
𝑁∑︁
𝑖=0
𝑏
(𝑛+1)
𝑖 𝑝(𝑗)1𝑋𝑗(𝑥𝑖) (6.2)
where 𝑏(1)𝑖 = 𝑏post𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑁, (6.3)
Φ(1)(M) = Φpost(M) (6.4)
are the characteristics of the eventM, computed in the first step, has the following form:
lim
𝑛→∞ 𝑏
(𝑛)
𝑥 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
𝑏𝑥∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋max
𝑏𝑥
, 𝑥 ∈ 𝑋max,
0, otherwise.
(6.5)
Proof follows from the Banach fixed-point theorem [3].
6Here the new co∼event-based semantics is that a believability distribution and a probability distribution of each co∼event hasthe corresponding value of the certainty measure of this co∼event.
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Figure 1: The recurrent sequence of calculations by the co∼event-based Bayes’ formula: a posteriori believability distributions ( orange ) and a
posteriori certainty ofM ( aqua ). Example 3 (left) and Example 4 (right).
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏𝑥/XM
0.200 0.667 0.013 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.133 0.133 0.133 0.050 0.050 0.133
1.000 0.333 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.025 0.025 0.067
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏
final
𝑥/XM0.200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.000 1.000 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
Table 13: The believability {︁𝑏𝑥/XM : 𝑥 ∈ XM}︁, probability {︁𝑝(𝑋/XM) : 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁, and certainty {︁𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XM) : 𝑥 ∈ XM, 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁
distributions of the co∼event M for Example 3.Φ(M) = 0.467, andΦfinal(M) = 1.000. Initial distributions (in the top table) and final distributions(in the bottom table) for the 10-th iterative calculation by the co∼event-based Bayes theorem.
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏𝑥/XM
0.240 0.500 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.038 0.038 0.100
0.360 0.500 0.010 0.010 0.003 0.003 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.038 0.038 0.100
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏
final
𝑥/XM0.240 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.360 1.000 0.020 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.075 0.075 0.200
Table 14: The believability {︁𝑏𝑥/XM : 𝑥 ∈ XM}︁, probability {︁𝑝(𝑋//XM) : 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁, and certainty {︁𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XM) : 𝑥 ∈ XM, 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁
distributions of the co∼event M for Example 4.Φ(M) = 0.300, andΦfinal(M) = 0.360. Initial distributions (in the top table) and final distributions(in the bottom table) for the 20-th iterative calculation by the co∼event-based Bayes theorem.
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Figure 2: The recurrent sequence of calculations by the co∼event-based Bayes’ formula: a posteriori believability distributions ( orange ) and a
posteriori certainty ofM ( aqua ). Example 5.
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏𝑥/XM
0.600 0.021 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
0.500 0.043 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
0.400 0.064 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
0.400 0.085 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
0.400 0.106 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
0.300 0.128 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
0.600 0.149 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
0.500 0.170 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017
0.500 0.191 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
0.600 0.043 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
𝑝(𝑋/XM) 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100
𝑝𝑥/XM 𝑏
final
𝑥/XM0.600 0.100 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
0.500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.600 0.700 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.070
0.500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.600 0.200 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Table 15: The believability {︁𝑏𝑥/XM : 𝑥 ∈ XM}︁, probability {︁𝑝(𝑋//XM) : 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁, and certainty {︁𝜙𝑥(𝑋//XM) : 𝑥 ∈ XM, 𝑋 ∈ SXM}︁
distributions of the co∼event M for Example 5.Φ(M) = 0.470, andΦfinal(M) = 0.600. Initial distributions (in the top table) and final distributions(in the bottom table) for the 50-th iterative calculation by the co∼event-based Bayes theorem.
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Corollary 2 (the limit certainty in a recurrent co∼event-based Bayes’ formula).
lim
𝑛→∞Φ
(𝑛)(M) =
1∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋max
𝑏𝑥
∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋max
∑︁
𝑥∈𝑋∈ SXM
𝑏𝑥𝑝(𝑋//XM). (6.6)
Proof is obvious.
Figures 1, and 2 and Tables 13, 14, and 15 illustrate Theorem and Corollary.
The recurrent application of the co∼event-based Bayes’ theorem can be interpreted as a repetition ofthe experienced-random experiment as a result of which the same co∼eventsH and R occur every time.Theorem 2 asserts that if the experienced-random experiment is repeated many times, the sequenceof believability distributions tends to the limit believability distribution. And the value of this limitdistribution can be considered as the same characteristic of the believabilities of co∼events H and R,which 1/2 is for the probabilistic distribution of a fair coin. Theorem 2 can serve as the basis for theformulation and proof of the co∼event law of large numbers.
7 Notes in conclusion
We exist in the world of uncertainties. Any uncertainty always arises from a conflict of experience andchance, more precisely, from a conflict between the observer’s experience and the chance observation.In other words, this indivisible pair, “experience and chance”, is the source of any uncertainty. Othersources of uncertainty simply do not exist. A theory that describes this conflict strictly mathematically isthe new theory, called the theory of co∼events, or the theory of experience and chance [1]. Now we can saythat this theory is a theory of uncertainty in its broadest sense7.
The eventology approach [6] gave impetus to the development of a theory that turned out to be broaderthan the theory of probabilities. This new theory is a dual combination of two theories— Kolmogorov’stheory of probabilities of ket-events (k-e.’s) and its dual reflection— a new theory of believabilities of bra-events (b-e.’s). Today, the theory of co∼events has a strict axiomatics [1, 4, 2], in which Kolmogorov k-e.’sdescribing the future chance of observation are dually reflected in b-e.’s describing the past experienceof the observer. The co∼events are defined as the measurable binary relations on the Cartesian product:“a set of b-e.’s × a set of terraced k-e.’s” and describe the present uncertainty that is generated by a pairof “experience and chance”.
Axiomatics of the theory of co∼events [1] terminates all the debate between differentphilosophical interpretations of probabilities: frequentist [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17],propensity [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26], or Bayesian (subjective) [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35,36, 37, 11, 12, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44] probabilities and also other philosophical interpretation ofprobabilities. This new theory is not one of the branches of probability theory. It offers a new axiomaticfoundation for all those theories that are fundamentally based onmathematical probability. For example,for the Bayesian (subjective), propensity, or frequentist probability. Until now, all these approaches reliedon the same mathematical probability Kolmogorov axiomatized. The new theory offers a new system ofaxioms, which contains Kolmogorov’s axiomatics as one of the dual halves. Therefore the new theoryof experience and chance as a rigorous axiomatic mathematical basis allows one to unite all existingacceptable interpretations of uncertainty into one general co∼event-based approach.
A past experience and a future chance are described by a unified theory. In the theory of co∼events[1] the logic of experience is directed to the past and the logic of chance is directed to the future. Sothe logic of experience reverses the logic of the chance with respect to the time direction. This is asimple consequence of the co∼event-based axiomatics where the experience is described by the b-e’s,and the chance is described by the k-e’s. And if some bra-event is experienced, then all the b-e’s thatare contained in it are experienced, i.e. which might be its possible causes in the past. And when someket-event happens, then all the k-e’s happen that contain it, i.e. which may be its consequences in the
7Although the paper [1] is devoted to the axioms of the new theory of experience and chance and is primarily a mathematicaltext, there are enough preliminary considerations in it that can help non-mathematicians understand the philosophy of the newtheory and get used to new terminology, which sometimes contradicts everyday meaning. The work [4] is of purely technicalsignificance for the new theory, mainly devoted to its mathematical apparatus and is intended for mathematicians. The work [2]tells about some applications of the new theory, which gave a decisive impetus to its development. In the paper [5] we consider avery simple example of the interpretation of the basic concepts of the theory in applications.
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future. So the logic of experience is always the logic of the past experience, and the logic of chance isalways the logic of the future chance. This theory introduces a new believability measure for measuringpast experience and uses the Kolmogorov probabilitymeasure to measure a future chance.
Only ameasuring the believability of all the probabilistic distribution of the ket-eventmakes sensein the theory of co∼events. I think everyone agrees that when tossing a fair coin, one typically canmeasure her/his believability only in that the outcomes “head” and “tail” are equally likely to happen.This obvious statement agrees with the co∼event-based axiomatics of the theory of experience andchance. If you toss a fair coin many times, then the new theory allows you to measure your believabilityonly in all the probabilistic distribution of this coin. In the framework of this theory, you can measureyour believability only in that the probability of a head happens and the probability of a tail happens aresomewhere near 1/2. In this theory, a measuring the believability in the fall of the head, or believabilityin the fall of the tail does not make sense. Only a measuring the believability of all the probabilisticdistribution of the coin makes sense here.
A measuring the believability of a set of b-e’s is a measuring its believability distribution. Also Ithink everyone agrees that when tossing a given set of unfair coins, one typically can measure her/hisbelievabilities only in a set of unfair coin probability distributions, i.e., one can measure only a set ofbelievabilities which form the believability distribution of the set of unfair coins. In other words, onecan measure only a set of believabilities the sum of which is equal to one. Thus, if you are interested inseveral believabilities in results of some experience-random experiment, then you can get the answeronly in the form of some believability distribution.
The measuring a co∼event in the theory of experience and chance means the measuring threeits measures simultaneously: probability, believability and certainty. In this theory the probabilitymeasure is defined on a set of observations (k-e’s), and the believability measure is defined on a set ofobservers (b-e’s). The probability measures the chances of observations, and the believability measuresthe experiences of observers. It is said that with certainty Φ(M) the co∼event M has the probabilitydistribution of k-e’s (observations) pXM and the believability distribution of b-e’s (observers) ?˘?XM . Thus,the certainty of a co∼event is a measure of the combination of its probabilistic and believabilisticmeasures, which is defined by this co∼event. In other words, we can say the certainty is a measure ofconflict between observer’ experiences with their believabilities and chances of observations with theirprobabilities. This new semantics of the old familiar terms in an unusual combination represents themain difficulty in understanding the new theory of experience and chance.
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